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There is a crisis in contemporary mathematics, and anybody 
who has not noticed it is being willfully blind. The crisis is 
due to our neglect of philosophical issues. The courses in the 
foundations of mathematics as taught in our universities emphasize 
the mathematical analysis of formal systems, at the expense of phil- 
osophical substance. Thus it is that the mathematical profession 
tends to equate philosophy with the study of formal systems, 
which require knowledge of technical theorems for comprehension. 
They do not want to learn yet another branch of mathematics and 
therefore leave the philosophy to the experts. As a consequence, 
we prove these theorems and we do not know what they mean. The 
job of proving theorems is not impeded by inconvenient inquiries 
into their meaning or purpose. In order to resolve one aspect 
of this crisis, emphasis will have to be transferred from the 
mechanics of the assembly line which keeps grinding out the 
theorems, to an examination of what is being produced. 
The product (i.e., the concepts, theorems and techniques) of 
this assembly line can be evaluated from at least three distinct 
standpoints: pure, applied (physical sciences), and applied 
(data processing). Today, I wish to concentrate mainly on pure 
mathematics, although the crisis certainly extends further. 
As pure mathematicians, we must decide whether we are’playing 
a game, or whether our theorems describe an external reality. 
Assuming that it is no game, we must be as clear as possible 
about what objects we are describing, and what it is that we are 
saying about those objects , The basic point here is already 
made in full force by considering the question “What do we mean 
by an integer?“. It is clear that the integer 3 differs in 
quality from the integer 
gg99gg 
which in turn differs in quality from the integer that is defined 
to be 1 if the four color theorem is true and is 0 otherwise. 
So then, there are at least three possibilities: (1) an integer 
may mean one that we can actually compute, (2) one that we can 
compute in principle only, or (3) one that is not computable by 
known techniques, even in principle. 
To my mind, it is a major defect of our profession that we 
refuse to distinguish, in a systematic way, between integers that 
are computable in principle and those that are not. We even 
refuse to do mathematics in such a way so as to permit one to 
make the distinction. Many mathematicians do not even find the 
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distinction interesting. Of course, the distinction between 
computable and non-computable, or constructive and non-constructive 
is the source of the most famous disputes in the philosophy of 
mathematics, and will continue to be the central issue for many 
years to come. 
Now, the little that I have read in the history of the philosophy 
of mathematics has left me with an overwhelming impression: that 
the history of the philosophy of mathematics is very dangerous. 
I am surprised that this point has only been made in passing at 
this meeting. I think that is should be a fundamental concern to 
the historians that what they are doing is potentially dangerous. 
The superficial danger is that it will be and in fact has been 
systematically distorted in order to support the status quo. 
And there is a deeper danger: it is so easy to accept the problems 
that have historically been regarded as significant as actually 
being significant. 
For example, there is a problem of the truth of the statement 
that every bounded monotone increasing sequence of real numbers 
converges. People sometimes ask me whether I believe that this 
or some similar statement is untrue. My answer is that it is not 
possible to answer the question until they tell me what interpret- 
ation they wish to attach to the statement. The statement is 
true when interpreted classically and false when interpreted 
constructively. Thus what are historically regarded as problems 
about truth are actually problems about meaning. I believe that 
if we agree on the meaning of such statements, then we can settle 
the question of their truth relatively easily. 
There is only one basic criterion to justify the philosophy 
of mathematics, and that is, does it contribute to making math- 
ematics more meaningful. It is not true that this criterion is 
commonly accepted. In fact, the philosophical criterion that 
most mathematicians prefer is that it enables them to prove more 
theorems and to be more secure about the theorems that they have 
already proved. 
A very brief review of the central historical controversy 
about the nature of mathematics will be sufficient for me to 
discuss with you what I believe to be the important philosophical 
issues in the philosophy of mathematics today. 
The controversy to which I refer is the grand dispute between 
Kronecker , Brouwer, H. Weyl and perhaps a few others on the one 
hand, who gave us techniques for deepening the meaning of math- 
ematics, and Hilbert and others, who to a great extent rejected 
their discoveries. Hilbert feared that his cherished theorems, 
his paradise, would be taken away. In fact, the threat was never 
real. The only real threat was to label Hilbert’s theorems for 
what they were, and to try to make some of them more meaningful; 
but perhaps Hilbert did not realize this. This controversy raged 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, finally 
having been resolved, in the opinion of many, in favor of Bourbaki. 
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I shall contend that had the disputants been less dogmatic and 
more thoughtful, then we might all be more thoughtful mathematicians 
today, and in fact perhaps be doing mathematics which is in some 
respects quite different from the mathematics that we are doing. 
Perhaps, the most logical place to begin looking at this 
dispute is with Cantor, because the paradoxes that arose in 
Cantorian set theory are what I think really provoked the crisis 
and the re-examination of the foundations of mathematics that 
took place. They gave the problem an urgency. 
People reacted to these contradictions in basically two ways: 
(1) Cantor himself, Hilbert, Russell and a host of others, seemed 
to believe that the Cantorian ideas were essentially correct, and 
that the task of philosophy was to secure them for posterity by 
analyzing the source of the contradictions and in some way 
insuring that the same thing would not happen again; (2) Brouwer, 
Weyl, Bore1 and possibly PoincarQ, took the contradictions as 
indicating that something was fundamentally wrong with Cantor’s 
ideas and possibly even with pre-Cantorian mathematics. Of course, 
Kronecker is a special case, because even before this particular 
set of contradictions, Kronecker had said that something was wrong 
with the classical theory of the real numbers, as it had been 
developed during his lifetime. 
It seems to me that the disputants in this controversy missed 
the point. The point is not whether a particular statement is 
true, but what do we mean by the statement. They should have 
been asking the question “What is a set?” and “What do we mean 
by the set of all sets?” instead of asking whether or not the 
set of all sets really existed. 
So, the wrong question was asked. It is fascinating to 
speculate what would have happened if they had asked the right 
question, that is, what do these things mean, not whether these 
things are true or false. I am going to reconstruct history, 
and tell you what might have happened and what I wish had happened, 
if the disputants had been more concerned with communicating to 
one another rather than justifying themselves and putting each 
other down. It is important to remember that Brouwer and Hilbert 
understood the propositions of Cantorian set theory in different 
ways. They attached different meanings to Cantorian set theory, 
so it was necessary that one of them should reject it and the 
other accept it. 
A similar situation undoubtedly held in the dispute between 
Kronecker and Weierstrass, about the validity of the real number 
system as it existed in those days. So there was a violation 
of the general philosophical principle not to discuss questions 
of truth until one settles questions of meaning. I think that 
Brouwer made a valiant attempt to say explicitly what meaning he 
attached to every mathematical theorem. For example, an integer 
to Brouwer (in my interpretation of Brouwer’s philosophy) is 
either an integer in decimal notation or a method that in principle 
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will lead after a finite number of steps to an integer in decimal 
notation. Again there is this notion of computability: if the 
integer is not given directly to be sure that it is finitely 
computable. This is as far as Brouwer could possibly have gone 
in expresssing himself on this subject. What was an integer to 
Hilbert? As far as I know he never discussed the point. 
Perhaps Brouwer should not have denounced the mathematics 
that Hilbert wished to do as meaningless, even though Hilbert 
did not go to the pains that Brouwer did in saying what he 
meant by his mathematics. Perhaps he should have said to 
Hilbert, “I have told you what I mean by these things to the 
best of my ability; now you tell me what these things mean 
to you!” This would have been the first step in my reconstruction: 
for Brouwer to have taken this approach in his dealings with 
Hilbert on the philosophical question. 
Then it is fascinating to try to anticipate what Hilbert’s 
response would have been if Brouwer had approached him in this 
way. I can think of three possibilities: 
(1) He could have said, “I cannot discuss that. The most I 
can do is to tell you the rules for doing mathematics and the 
meaning is then to be found in the rules plus whatever additional 
personal meaning you wish to read into it.” If this had been the 
answer, then the designation of formalist that has been attached 
to Hilbert is indeed justified. 
(2) Possibly Hilbert would have responded by a description 
of the inductive construction of the Cantorian universe, in as 
much detail and with as much care as it was possible for him to 
give. I doubt if he would have done so. 
(3) Possibly Hilbert would have responded to Brouwer as follows: 
“I understand your explanation and the meaning that you attach 
to the objects and statements of mathematics, with the exception 
perhaps of your theory of choice sequences, which however can 
be omitted without significantly affecting the mathematics that 
you would be doing. In my opinion, you have a valid and consistent 
point of view, but there are other points of view, and I do not 
think that you should reject them as being meaningless. In 
your system of mathematics,everything ultimately reduces to 
finite computation within the set of integers. Let us extend 
your mathematics by allowing infinite computations. For most 
purposes, one particular kind of infinite computation will 
suffice: the examination of a sequence of integers to determine 
whether or not they all vanish. With this extended mathematics, I 
shall rest content. ‘I It would not have been possible for Hilbert 
to have preserved the Cantorian paradise within this extended 
mathematics, which allows in addition this one infinite computation 
consisting of the examination of a sequence of integers. But I 
suspect that what Hilbert really wanted to preserve was his own 
mathematics and other mathematics of the same sort. This certainly 
would have been possible under the system that I proposed that 
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Hilbert propose. If he really wished to preserve the full 
Cantorian paradise, he would have been compelled to introduce 
other infinite computations. 
Let us go back to Brouwer. Assuming that Hilbert had responded 
as I told you that he should have done, Brouwer might then have 
replied as follows: "I appreciate your motivation, but I will 
not permit you to introduce any new computations into mathematics. 
The object constructed by an infinite computation is inherently 
different from an object constructed by a finite computation, as 
I have already told you many times. Your proposal would make it 
impossible to distinguish between them in a systematic way. 
However, there is a course which I believe will satisfy both of 
us. Let LPO (limited principle of omniscience) denote the state- 
ment that it is possible to make an infinite computation of the 
type we described, that is, searching a sequence of integers to 
see whether they all vanish. Then if we need LPO to prove a 
theorem, simply develop your mathematics in my system as the 
implication LPO implies whatever the theorem happens to be. You 
will be able to do your mathematics in my system without any loss 
ofmeaningandwithoutanyessentialchangeinthemethodyouhave 
alreadybeenusing. Forme todomymathematics inyour systemwould 
entailasignificantlossofmeaning. Sincewecouldbothworkinmy 
systemandpursuewhatwewanttodoand I cannotworkinyour system, 
please defertomeandacceptmysystem." Hilbertwouldthenhaveac- 
cepted Brouwer'sproposalandmathematics wouldnotbewhere it is today. 
Where would mathematics be today if all this had come about? 
We would accept the meanings of "or", "there exists" and all the 
other connectives and quantifiers, as defined by Brouwer, not as 
defined classically. In particular, negation, disjunction, and 
existence would have their meanings changed. We would improve 
on Brouwerls definition of set in a way that I do not want to 
go into here. Classical mathematics would go on entirely as 
before except that every theorem would be written as an implication, 
either LPO + A or some extended version of an infinite computation 
implying A. So Hilbert's Cantorian paradise would remain intact 
within Brouwerls system. Those mathematicians who still believe 
in the Cantorian paradise as representing ultimate truth, would 
not be forced to taste forbidden fruit. On the other hand, when 
they saw that other mathematicians were tasting the fruit and 
thriving on the diet, they might decide that there was no reason 
to hold out. Of course, new vistas would be opened up, and it 
might transpire that Hilbert's paradise was not so perfect after 
all. 
This is all very abstract. I want to take a concrete instance 
and illustrate what we might be doing. Unfortunately, I am 
about the only one who is doing it now and so I must apologize 
for choosing a concrete instance from my own mathematics. This 
theorem is not crucial, but it is an efficient demonstration of 
the sort of thing I am talking about, namely, the classical 
512 E. Bishop HM2 
theorem that a function of bounded variation defined on the unit 
interval has a derivative almost everywhere. Now you might say 
that it does have a derivative almost everywhere and I would not 
disagree with you. But, if I wanted to talk to you in your own 
language, I would say compute the derivative. I suspect that 
many of you would answer, “I do not know how to compute the 
derivative”. Some of you might say “I do not care” and others 
might really care and simply not know. Or, you might reply: 
“If you care whether you can compute the derivative, go ahead 
and consider the question, but do not try to change the whole 
system of mathematics just because you want to consider questions 
of whether you can compute things”. 
My point is that you cannot consider questions of whether you 
can compute things systematically and do a good job of it, unless 
you do change the whole system of mathematics. Now this does 
not seem to be true in things like number theory. One can do 
ad hoc constructivism in number theory and I do not think that 
it has posed any problems to do it that way. One simply cannot 
do ad hoc constructivism in analysis and develop good general 
theorems which correspond to the theorems of classical mathematics. 
In fact, there have been fewer analysts interested in constructive 
questions than there have been number theorists, and I suggest 
that it is because the classical system has tied their hands. 
So let us see what we are going to do with this theorem, call 
it “A”, that a function of bounded variation has a derivative 
almost everywhere. The classical “prooft actually proves A’, which 
is the theorem LPO + A. 
The harder problem is to prove A without using LPO. You simply 
cannot. Brouwer could have easily shown that there is no hope 
of actually computing the derivative of a function of bounded 
variation, essentially because the derivative does not necessarily 
get approximated when the function gets approximated. 
Since there is no hope of proving Theorem A, you might think 
that the constructivist mathematicians should then rest content. 
He knows that he cannot get Theorem A in his system, and the 
classical mathematicians have already given him LPO -+ A. However, 
constructivism is not that trivial. This is what I mean by say- 
ing that accepting Brouwer’s system would deepen the meaning of 
mathematics. Even though we cannot prove A, we still think that 
the implication LPO + A is ugly. So what can we do if we do not 
like the implication and we cannot prove the theorem? We can get 
an implication which is natural and reflects the nature of the 
problem. LPO is a general hypothesis not related at all to the 
structure of this particular theorem in any special way. Let us 
replace the left hand side of this implication by some statement 
which is naturally and, after we give it to you, obviously involved 
with the conclusion on the right hand side. Let f be the function 
of bounded variation whose derivative we wish to compute. Let 
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B(f) be the statement that we can compute the total variation of 
f. [I put it in this way for the benefit of the non-constructivists 
in the audience.) The theorem that I want to state is that if we 
can compute the total variation then we can compute the derivative: 
B(f) + A(f). This is a much stronger, much more natural and much 
more useful result than LPO -+ A. It is about the best that we can 
hope to do if you think about it; you cannot hope to get anything 
better than that. 
[At this point Garrett Birkhoff gave another variant, the 
Jordan decomposition of a function of bounded variation. You 
can break such a function down into decreasing and increasing 
functions, so that your theorem would say that you can construct- 
ively prove that an increasing function is everywhere differentiable, 
because you then know the variation. Bishop agreed, pointing out 
that just because you can compute the derivative almost everywhere, 
does not guarantee that you can decompose it.] 
In addition, we have a very nice corollary, generalizing it 
in an essential way, not trivially. We get the fact that an 
indefinite integral of an integrable function has a derivative 
equal to that function almost everywhere. This is because you 
can compute the total variation of the indefinite integrai which 
is, of course, equal to the integral of the absolute value of 
the function. 
This is the kind of mathematics that we might be doing. We 
might be taking many classical theorems and doing exactly this 
sort of thing to them if history had taken the course that I 
have discussed. 
Actually, the development of this particular example should 
not stop here, because whenever you have a theorem: B + A, then 
you suspect that you have a theorem: B is approximately true + 
A is approximately true. So there should be an even further 
development of this theory, namely to say what we mean for B to 
be approximately true, and then we have conjectured an implication, 
which we should try to prove. I have not done this, but it 
occured to me while preparing this talk that the conjecture is 
clear enough. I shall not take the time to present it here. 
In a way, the imaginary dialogue that I presented here might 
be regarded as a historical investigation if you believe as I do 
that it shows how two titanic figures such as these might have 
reached an accommodation that would have changed the course of 
mathematics in a profound way, had they spoken to each other 
with less emotion and more concern for understanding each other. 
Instead, Hilbert tried to show that it was all right to 
neglect computational meaning, because it could ultimately be 
recovered by an elaborate formal analysis of the techniques of 
proof. This artificial program failed. 
A more recent attempt at mathematics by formal finesse is 
non-standard analysis. I gather that it has met with some degree 
of success, whether at the expense of giving significantly less 
meaningful proofs I do not know. My interest in non-standard 
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analysis is that attempts are being made to introduce it into 
calculus courses. It is difficult to believe that debasement of 
meaning could be carried so far. 
Many mathematicians regard the theory of computation as a 
branch of recursive function theory. It is true that many 
constructivists, for instance the school of Markov in Russia, are 
recursivists. Brouwer, of course was not. The recursive construct- 
ivists seem to be motivated by the desire to avoid such vague terms 
as “rulel’ and “set”. Their mathematics is forbiddingly involved 
and laborious, a great price to pay for the precision they hope to 
attain. My personal opinion is that they have not attained any 
additional precision. Perhaps any attempt to make the notion of 
“rule” more precise is futile. It is clear that the concept of 
a set, in its full generality, can be avoided to a very great 
extent, again however, at the price of awkward complications. 
More research is needed on this point. 
In my opinion, the positive contributions of recursive function 
theory to both constructive mathematics and the more concrete 
aspects of the theory of computation are the construction of 
counterexamples, but here again inpressions are somewhat mis- 
leading. The methods of Brouwer, now largely neglected, are more 
suitable for providing counterexamples in most cases of interest 
than are the methods of recursive function theory. 
That is all I want to say about pure mathematics. I would 
like to consider next another very interesting question that has 
occupied many people: what does the constructivist point of view 
entail for the applications of mathematics to physics? My own 
feeling is that the only reason mathematics is applicable is 
because of its inherent constructive content. By making that 
constructive content explicit, you can only make mathematics 
more applicable, Hermann Weyl seems to have had an opposite 
opinion. For him, the utility of mathematics extended even to 
that part of mathematics that was not inherently computational. 
I hesitate to disagree with Weyl, but I do. It is a very serious 
subject for investigation; it would be interesting and worthwhile 
to settle this point. 
I have one final concern to express today. Perhaps the most 
critical problem in applied mathematics is what to do about the 
over-mathematization of our society. The scientists who devel- 
oped the atom bomb would like to feel that they were not responsible 
for its use. Those of us who teach calculus etc. would like to 
feel that we are not responsible for the inappropriate uses to 
which our instruction is put and I am not talking about the 
construction of bombs. In these days, mathematics is being applied 
to psychology, to economics, etc. in a very thoughtless way. We 
need a philosophy, if that is the right word, of when mathematics 
is applicable and when it is not. In the meantime, I tell my 
stlrdents that I doubt the validity of many of the applications 
of mathematics to the non-physical sciences that are presented 
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in the text books, and that more important than being able to do 
mathematics is to be sure the applications are meaningful. 
I want to discuss today one fundamental reason why mathematics 
is so often applied so thoughtlessly: the arrogance of mathema- 
ticians. I have experienced this arrogance ever since I began 
work in the philosophy of mathematics and I am sure that you 
historians have experienced it too. People tell me in so many 
words that when I was proving theorems, I was doing something 
original and worthwhile; but when I started to think about phil- 
osophical questions, I could not possibly be doing anything deep. 
This prejudice, that all good work must be technical in the 
mathematical sense, has made economists, sociologists, etc, feel 
inferior , as if they should mathematicize, very often to the 
detriment of the real meaning of their work. 
DISCUSSION 
Aspray and Moore asked Bishop to comment of the work of Fitting, 
Troelstra and Kreisel, who have also worked on Brouwer’s ideas. 
The following discussion ensued. 
Bishop: Intuitionism was transmuted by Heyting from something 
which was anti-formal to something which is formal. When one 
speaks today of intuitionism, one is talking of all sorts of 
formal systems (studied by the logicians). That’s not what Brouwer 
had in mind. 
Moore: So you see yourself more the follower of Brouwer 
than Heyting or Kreisel are? (Bishop concurred.) 
Kline: You did not indicate where one should stand on LPO 
(the limited principle of omniscience) described in your paper. 
Should it be accepted? Should one opt for a more limited 
assumption? Or should one not accept it and follow the intuition- 
ists? Or is this a personal question? After all, one can prove 
more with LPO than without it. 
Bishop: It is personal, because it is not going to affect 
our mathematics. Write the theorems that need LPO in their 
proofs as implications, and be careful not to use LPO for results 
that can be achieved without the use of it. 
Mackey: Would you please justify your use of the word 
“crisis”? What terrible things are going to happen if we ignore 
what your’re telling us? To put the question differently, let 
us compare this with the relationship of mathematics to physics. 
Consider the foundational question in physics: what is the real 
mathematics that the physicists are doing? The physicists don’t 
516 E. Bishop HM2 
care; they go ahead and say that they can get the kind of results 
they want -- and do. But we don’t tell the physicists that they 
are having a big crisis. How do you compare these situations? 
Bishop: Meaning in physics is different from meaning in 
mathematics. I am not a physicist; but physicists have told me 
that the sort of meaning that is appropriate to physics is not 
to ask whether the mathematics in question is rigorous. Rather, 
it involves the relations of the results to the real world. 
Mackey: Brouwer had a point, but my reaction is that I don’t 
want to think about these questions. I have faith that what I am 
doing will have some kind of meaning -- no matter what the status 
of these questions is. 
Bishop: You can keep your attitude; but why can’t you give 
me the kind of cooperation that Brouwer was willing to give 
Hilbert in my imaginary dialogue? Such cooperation will not 
harm your attitude. Mathematicians have cut themselves off 
from a large portion of mathematics which many, including myself, 
have thought to be meaningful because of their refusal to adopt 
a system that would cost them nothing. 
Birkhoff: I think I have an answer to both Kline’s and Mackey’s 
queries. If mathematicians would admit that they don’t know the 
answer to these fundamental questions, e.g. whether LPO or the 
Axion of Choice are true under all circumstances, and would keep 
an open mind about them, the situation would be better. I think 
this is what Bishop is urging. We should keep track of our 
assumptions, and keep an open mind. 
Freudenthal: Bishop’s thesis, that there is a crisis in 
mathematics, is not new. There has always been a crisis in 
mathematics. The present is not any different from other times 
in mathematics. For example, before Cauchy and Gauss complex 
numbers were considered a crisis in mathematics. 
Dieudonng: There is no crisis in mathematics. Mathematics 
has never been as prosperous as it has been in the last ten 
years. Never before had we proved so many new and powerful 
theorems. I just want to work in the way Gauss, Riemann, and 
Poincar& worked; I want nothing else. 
Abhyankar: My paper is in complete sympathy with Bishop’s 
position. 
Kahane: I agree partly with Bishop, partly with Dieudonn&. 
I have to respect Bishop’s work; but I find it boring. Perhaps 
it is boring to me because the constructivists do not have a 
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unified consistent language. 
Bishop: Most mathematicians feel that mathematics has meaning, 
but it bores them to try to find out what it is. You are typical 
of most mathematicians. 
Kahane: I feel that Bishop’s appreciation has more significance 
than my lack of appreciation. 
Dreben: It has often been said that the main reason for the 
development of mathematical logic has been the paradoxes of 
Cantorian set theory. That is historically false. Frege, the 
greatest logician since Aristotle and the creator of the foundations 
of mathematical logic, that is, quantification theory and a totally 
formalized language for mathematics, had nothing to do with 
Cantorian paradoxes. The main reason for the development of pure 
mathematical logic, first by Frege and then by Russell (and 
Whitehead), was philosophical. Both Frege and Russell were 
motivated in their early work primarily by a desire to refute Kant. 
What is historically and philosophically interesting is that each 
of them took essentially the same technical path in order to 
refute Kant’s thesis about the nature of pure arithmetic and its 
relation to logic; yet they came up with different conclusions. 
This might be taken as evidence for Wittgenstein’s position that 
no technical result will ever really resolve any technical philos- 
ophical problem. Kant held that logic is analytic but arithmetic 
is synthetic a priori. Frege thought that in his Grundlagen 
der Ari thmetik [CS], and later in his Grundges2itze der Arithmetik 
[CS], he had shown (by “reducing” it to logic) that pure arithmetic 
is analytic a priori,contrariwise. Russell in his classical 
period up to 1912 believed that the “logical reduction” had shown 
Kant to be right about arithmetic but wrong about logic; that is, 
since arithmetic was “derivable” from logic, logic had to be 
synthetic a priori. Of course, both Frege and Russell held that 
Kant had too narrow a conception of logic and was wrong in thinking 
that arithmetic and hence mathematics rested on extralogical modes 
of reasoning. The epistemic nature of logic and pure mathematics 
were what seemed important to them. 
